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THE SECTION FIVE QUAGMIRE
Ruth Colker
In this Article, Professor Ruth Colker offers a four-part framework for deter-
mining whether Congress has constitutionally abrogated state sovereign immunity
when it provides a cause of action for damages pursuant to its enforcement
powers under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, Congress must
explicitly abrogate state sovereign immunity if the legislation infringes on a tradi-
tional and essential state function. Second, Congress must create an ample
legislative record to justify the need for such legislation. Third, Congress must be
seeking to protect interests in an area in which the Court has previously found
that some genuine rights exist. This third principle, Colker argues, primarily
applies when Congress is seeking to enforce the Due Process Clause, because
genuine rights exist for all classes of persons under the Equal Protection Clause.
Fourth, Congress's enforcement efforts under section five must not, themselves,
violate another provision of the Constitution. This fourth principle most often
arises when Congress seeks to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Colker argues
that the fourth principle has caused the most confusion in the lower courts. She
argues that lower courts are wrong to conclude that the mere fact that legislation
relies, in part, on a "special protection" perspective rather than on a "color-blind"
perspective means that it conflicts with the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. Applying this framework to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, Colker argues that the private cause of action for damages against state
actors is constitutional.
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INTRODUCTION
In what could be considered the Brown v. Board of Education' for the
law of disability discrimination, the United States Supreme Court ruled in
Olmstead v. L.C.2 that undue institutionalization and segregation' of individu-
als with disabilities by state actors qualifies as unlawful "discrimination" under
Title 1I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA Title II).' Although
the employment title of the ADA' has received the most attention in the
media6 and the courts,7 ADA Title II is of equal importance to individuals
1. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (repudiating the "separate but equal" doctrine).
2. 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
3. The Court implicitly endorsed the "integration regulation" promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Justice under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA Title II) in which it
required state actors to "administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998).
The Olmstead Court did not have to determine the validity of these regulations because the state
did not challenge the regulatory formulations themselves. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2183.
4. ADA Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150 (1994). This title provides that "no quali-
fied individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be sub-
jected to discrimination by any such entity." Id. § 12132. A "public entity" includes "any State
or local government." Id. § 12131(1)(A).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
6. See Linda Greenhouse, The Justices Decide Who's in Charge, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999,
§ 4, at 1.
7. Of the 75 cases heard by the Court last term, four of them involved the ADA's
employment title. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2174 (1999) (holding
that an employer who requires as a job qualification that an employee meet an otherwise applica-
ble federal safety regulation need not justify enforcing the regulation solely because its standard
may be waived in an individual case); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149
(1999) (holding that the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with
The Section Five Quagmire 655
with disabilities.8 With the unemployment rate for individuals with disabili-
ties hovering around 70 percent,9 many of these individuals are dependent
upon state programs and services for their very survival." ADA Title II
directly prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by state actors and
provides for a broad array of relief, including retrospective damages." The
reference to measures that mitigate the individual's impairment, and that the plaintiffs failed to
properly allege that the employer "regarded" them as having a disability within the meaning of the
ADA); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137 (1999) (holding that the
lower court correctly evaluated the plaintiff in his medicated state to determine whether he was
an individual with a disability, and that the lower court correctly determined that the plaintiff was
not regarded as disabled); Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1600 (1999)
(holding that pursuit and receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance benefits do not automati-
cally estop the recipient from pursuing an ADA claim).
8. There is no way to know precisely how many claims have been filed under ADA Title
II, because such figures are not officially available from the court system. Through a Westlaw search,
I was able to locate 122 nonemployment actions brought against public entities that resulted in
reported appellate decisions between 1992 and 1998. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities
Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 n.7 (1999). Although not all
ADA Title II claims were for retrospective damages, it is reasonable to assume that such a remedy
was sought in nearly every employment discrimination claim.
9. See Diane E. Lewis, Access and Closed Doors: Despite Federal Act, Number of Disabled with
No Job Is Rising, BOSTON GLOBE, July 4, 1999, at G7 (reporting that pollster Louis Harris & Asso-
ciates "found that 71 percent of people with disabilities who are of working age were unemployed
in 1998, 5 percentage points higher than in 1986, when the study was first conducted").
10. The plaintiffs in Olmstead were dependent on state services. L.C. and E.W. are mentally
retarded; L.C. has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and E.W. with a personality disorder. See
Olmstead v. L. C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2183 (1999). Other individuals with disabilities are capable
of gainful employment but are in need of state educational programs to improve their skills and
abilities. See, e.g., Petersen v. Hastings Pub. Sch., 31 F.3d 705, 705-06 (8th Cir. 1994) (challenging
the method of instruction that is used for children with hearing impairments). Yet other individuals
with disabilities have obtained state employment but need antidiscrimination protections at the
workplace. See, e.g., Kilcullen v. New York State Dep't of Transp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 133 (N.D.N.Y.
1999) (challenging a termination under ADA Title II).
11. ADA Title II incorporates the remedies of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994) ("The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section
794a of Title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any per-
son alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.").
Section 794a provides that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA Title VII) remedies
apply for employment discrimination complaints and that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(CRA Title VI) remedies apply for all other types of complaints. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a. There is
no question that CRA Title VII permits awards for retrospective damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(1) (providing for back pay or "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate"); see
also Civil Rights Act of 1991, id. § 1981a(b)(1) (providing for compensatory but not punitive
damages against state defendants). CRA Title VI does not explicitly provide for damages relief,
but it has been interpreted to provide for retrospective damages in cases of intentional dis-
crimination. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598 (1983) (providing that
intentional discrimination is a prerequisite to recovery for compensatory damages). In 1986, Con-
gress also amended CRA Title VI to make it clear that it was abrogating state sovereign immunity
under Title VI. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807,
1845 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7). The incorporation of the CRA Title VI remedial scheme
into the ADA context creates some interpretation problems, because discrimination under the
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disability community, therefore, applauded the pro-plaintiff holding in
Olmstead as a welcome tool in its efforts to provide dignity in the lives of its
members. 2
The Olmstead victory, however, may be pyrrhic. The Court may be on
the brink of ruling that ADA Title II exceeds Congress's enforcement
authority under section five" of the Fourteenth Amendment 4 and thereby
unconstitutionally abrogates the states' sovereign immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment" when it provides for a private right of action for dam-
ages. Continuing with a recent trend, 6 the Supreme Court ruled in three
non-civil rights cases last term that Congress improperly abrogated the states'
sovereign immunity in providing for private damages actions in suits against
state defendants. 7 Most recently, the Supreme Court ruled in Kimel v.
ADA can be found for failure to provide reasonable accommodations. It is not clear whether
compensatory damages should be available in such cases, because a failure to provide reasonable
accommodation may not necessarily meet the intent standard under CRA Title VI. This problem
is beyond the scope of this Article but was discussed at some length by the trial court judge in Bartlett
v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1149-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 119 S. Ct.
2388 (1999).
12. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Justices Reject 'Unnecessary Segregation' of Mentally Disabled
at State Hospitals, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1999, at AIO.
For disability-rights activists, the case was hailed as the "Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion decision" for the disabled, a reference to the 1954 ruling that outlawed racial segre-
gation in public schools. In California, a coalition representing 24 groups statewide that
help persons with disabilities called the ruling "a milestone for the independent-living
movement."
Id.
13. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
14. See Interview with Professor Leon Friedman, Morning Edition (National Public Radio
broadcast, June 24, 1999) (saying that the "bottom line" from the Supreme Court's federalism deci-
sions is that the ADA and other civil rights statutes are "out the window").
15. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
This Article does not consider whether ADA Title II could be found to be unconstitutional
under the Tenth Amendment as improperly commandeering the states. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (holding that a congressional act that commandeers state legisla-
tures violates the Tenth Amendment).
16. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (determining that Congress had
exceeded its enforcement authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57 (1996) (hold-
ing that Congress lacked authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
17. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999) (invalidating the private damages
remedy under the Fair Labor Standards Act as it applies to the states even when sued in state
court); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219,
2225 (1999) (invalidating the private damages remedy under the Trademark Remedy Clarifica-
tion Act as it applies to the states); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College
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Florida Board of Regents1" that Congress exceeded its authority under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by abrogating
state sovereign immunity in creating a private right of action for dam-
ages against state officials. Kimel is the first decision to conclude that
Congress exceeded its authority to enact legislation in the civil rights
area.
The ADEA is not the only civil rights statute to come under
attack in recent years as exceeding Congress's powers under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lower courts have struck down
the private damages action provided against state defendants under
the ADA,' 9 the Equal Pay Act (EPA)," and the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA). 2 Although so far unsuccessful, state defendants
Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2211 (1999) (invalidating the private damages remedy under the Pat-
ent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act as not sustainable under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
18. Nos. 98-791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2000).
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); see Larry v. Board of Trustees, 996 F. Supp. 1366, 1368
(N.D. Ala. 1998) (finding that Congress does not have the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment rights with regard to the Equal Pay Act). But see Belch v. Board of Regents, 27 F.
Supp. 2d 1341, 1344 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (finding that abrogation of state sovereign immunity under
the Equal Pay Act was a permissible exercise of Congress's enforcement power under section five
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Perdue v. City Univ., 13 F. Supp. 2d 326, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(finding that Congress properly enacted the Equal Pay Act pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
21. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. III
1997); see Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 419 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that
the FMLA exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under section five); Driesse v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that Congress did not provide une-
quivocal and textual evidence of its intent to abrogate state immunity under the FMLA, and that the
FMLA exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under section five); McGregor v. Goord, 18 F. Supp.
2d 204 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that an FMLA damage suit against a state was not a valid exercise
of Congress's section five powers); Thomson v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (S.D.
Ohio 1998) (holding that the FMLA exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under section five).
The Violence Against Women Act has also been challenged on section five grounds. See
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 16, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (1994)); see also Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytech-
nic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628,
636-38 (M.D. La. 1999) (finding that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the Violence Against Women Act). But see Ericson
v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 326, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that the Violence Against
Women Act is a lawful exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
The Violence Against Women Act does not regulate state government, but the Fourth Cir-
cuit has considered whether it can be justified under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because it has concluded that the statute cannot be justified under the Commerce Clause. See
Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 862. Because defendants in actions brought under the Violence Against
Women Act are typically private defendants, the section five issue for this statute is whether
have challenged the private damages action permitted for disparate-
impact claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA
Title VII).22 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Kimel, one can
easily predict that the constitutionality of ADA Title II's enforce-
ment scheme will be considered in a subsequent term."
These challenges to the civil rights acts are based on the general Elev-
enth Amendment rule that states are immune from private suits.24 Two
important exceptions to this rule exist. First, private plaintiffs can sue state
officials for injunctive relief, although not for retrospective damages, under the
holding in Ex Parte Young.25 Second, Congress may abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity and permit private plaintiffs to sue states
Congress can use section five to regulate private actors. Whether section five should be construed
so as always to require Congress to directly regulate state action is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. For an argument that state action should not be required under section five, see generally
Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts,
73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964) (arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended con-
gressional enforcement power to extend to private acts).
22. CRA Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); see, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (finding that Con-
gress did not exceed its section five authority when it subjected the states to liability for Title VII
disparate impact claims of discrimination). A similar challenge could be brought against the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994)
(providing for a disparate impact theory against state actors and compensatory damages).
23. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents involved the constitu-
tionality of both the ADEA's and the ADA's enforcement schemes in a consolidated appeal of three
lower court cases. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (1 1th Cit. 1998), affd,
2000 WL 14165. The plaintiffs sought certiorari to challenge the ADEA determination, and one
state sought certiorari to challenge the ADA determination. The Supreme Court decided the
ADEA issue in Kimel, 2000 WL 14165. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The Court has
now granted certiorari to consider "[wihether Congress exceeded the scope of its authority to
,enforce' the Fourteenth Amendment when it made the broad employment provisions of Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act applicable to the states," see Florida Dep't of Corrections
v. Dickson, No. 98-829, 2000 WL 46077 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2000), and in a separate case that has
been consolidated with Dickson the Court will consider "[wihether the ADA was a proper exercise of
the power granted to Congress by Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment... such that the immu-
nity granted to the State of Arkansas by the Eleventh Amendment... was abrogated," see Alsbrook
v. City of Maumelle, No. 99-423, 2000 WL 63302 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2000).
24. Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment refers only to suits commenced by citi-
zens of another state, the Supreme Court has interpreted it also to protect states against suits
brought by citizens of their own state. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890). The Elev-
enth Amendment has not eradicated all lawsuits against the states, because the Supreme Court
held in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908), that a federal court could issue an injunction
against a state officer executing an unconstitutional state statute, on the ground that the state was
not really a defendant (it was the officer, acting beyond his constitutional authority). The reme-
dies permissible against a state were considered again in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974),
when the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment permits lawsuits for prospective injunctive
relief against state officers, but not lawsuits for retrospective damages relief. See id. at 678.
25. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 167; supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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directly for retrospective damages, pursuant to its power under section five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, under the holding in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.26
It may not, however, abrogate state sovereign immunity by passing legislation
pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, under the holding in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida."7 Thus, when Congress seeks to create retrospective dam-
ages relief for private individuals in suits against states, it frequently uses its
powers under section five to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
Technically, the relief sought in Olmstead--declaratory and injunctive-
should be available under Ex Parte Young even if the Court does conclude
that Congress improperly abrogated state sovereign immunity in creating a
private cause of action for damages. An alarming signal from Olmstead is
that the Court was almost willing28 to consider the constitutionality of the
enforcement scheme under section five in a case involving injunctive or
declaratory relief.29 Further, the Kimel Court did not qualify its holding by
noting that the ADEA should still be applicable to suits against states for
injunctive or declaratory relief. As the Court continues to expand its under-
standing of the states' sovereign immunity,0 it is possible that the Court will
26. 427 U.S. 445, 457 (1976) (holding that back pay and attorneys fees provided by the
CRA were not precluded by the Eleventh Amendment).
27. 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
28. In Olmstead, the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari on the question of whether
ADA Title II exceeded Congress's section five enforcement powers, but it then amended its order
granting certiorari to limit the case to another issue. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 633, 633
(1998) ("The order of December 14, 1998, granting the petition for a writ of certiorari is amended
as follows: 'The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to Question 1 presented by the
petition."'); Summary of Orders: Olmstead v. L.C., 67 U.S.L.W. 3385, 3386 (BNA) (U.S. Dec.
15, 1998) (listing two questions presented, with the second question reading: "If that portion of
ADA is so construed [to be constitutional], does it exceed enforcement power granted to Congress
in Section 5 of 14th Amendment?"). Similarly, in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,
524 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1998), the Court noted the presence of the section five jurisdictional issue
but chose not to decide the issue because it was not addressed by the district court or court of appeals.
29. Distinguishing between retrospective and prospective relief is often difficult, as dem-
onstrated by the Olnstead petitioners' argument that Ex Parte Young "does not permit suits for
injunctions where the violations are not continuing and where state finds are to be used for redress
of past wrongs. In the present case, the patients sought state-paid community placements-
placements that the state provided and continues to provide." See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 6,
Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999) (No. 98-536) (citation omitted). The petitioners in Olmstead
were seeking an injunction to remove them from a segregated, institutional setting to a more
integrated, community setting. Because the Court decided not to grant certiorari on the section five
issue, it did not have to determine on which side of the retrospective/prospective line the petitioners'
case fell. For further discussion of this distinction, see Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985)
(finding that the "notice" relief sought by the plaintiffs violated Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity principles).
30. In Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999), the Court made it clear that the "sovereign
immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amend-
ment." Id. at 2246. Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment only refers to the "Judicial
power of the United States," the Court concluded in Alden that Congress did not have the power
narrow or overturn the holding in Ex Parte Young.3 Such a decision would
be lethal to ADA Title II itself. But even a more modest conclusion-that
principles of state sovereign immunity preclude a private right of action for
damages-would strike at the heart of ADA Title Il's effectiveness. A
damages cause of action provides a financial incentive for plaintiffs to bring
cases to enforce their rights under ADA Title IL and creates the possibility
of contingent fee arrangements; a remedial scheme consisting exclusively of
injunctive relief under ADA Title III has proven to be ineffective.32
Nonetheless, even as the Court struck down the private rights of action
for damages in three non-civil rights statutes this last term, it reiterated the
familiar principle that "in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people
required the states to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been
preserved for them by the original Constitution, so Congress may authorize
private suits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its § 5 enforcement
power."" In addition, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,"4 which held that private plaintiffs
under Article I of the Constitution to subject nonconsenting states to private suits in their own
courts. See id. at 2256.
31. The Olmstead petitioners suggested that result when they noted in their brief:
Surely a sudden decision to require all States to provide the "least restrictive treatment"
to their citizens in State hospitals would brush up against the boundaries of section five
power under the Fourteenth Amendment, if not surpass them, while at the same time
imposing substantial and largely indeterminate new financial obligations on the States.
Petitioner's Brief at *15, Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999), available at 1999 WL 54623.
Whether Ex Parte Young should be retained is beyond the scope of this Article.
32. Based on my research on a different part of the ADA-Title 111-I conclude that
injunctive relief is not an effective remedy to enforce the ADA. ADA Title III, which provides
for nondiscrimination on the basis of disability at places of public accommodation, only provides
for declaratory and injunctive relief in suits brought by private individuals. See ADA Title III, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). These remedies, as predicted by Senator
Harkin at the time of passage, have been ineffective in obtaining widespread Title III compliance.
See Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forth-
coming 2000). I have located 128 ADA Title II employment discrimination actions that have
been reported between July 1992 and July 1998 in the courts of appeal. See Table (on file with
author). It is very likely that retrospective damages were sought in nearly all those cases. These
appellate employment discrimination actions are only a small sample of all ADA Title II cases,
because they only include cases with reported appellate decisions and only include cases involving
employment complaints. My research also indicates that far fewer cases have been reported under
ADA Title III than under ADA Title II. There were 128 ADA Title II employment actions and
122 ADA Title II nonemployment actions reported by the courts of appeal between 1992 and
1998; by contrast, there were only 23 ADA Title III reported appellate cases. See Colker, supra
note 8, at 100 n.7. One explanation for the stark contrast between the number of cases reported
under ADA Title II and under ADA III is the differing remedies available to prevailing plaintiffs.
33. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267. The Court also reaffirmed that principle in Kimel when it
recognized that "[slection five of the Fourteenth Amendment," however, "does grant Congress the
authority to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity." Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, Nos. 98-
791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2000).
34. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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may sue states directly for retrospective damages pursuant to section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, has not been overruled. I will argue that these
seemingly contradictory perspectives can be reconciled if one distinguishes
the Court's section five decisions in the civil rights context from its section
five decisions in the non-civil rights context.
In Part I of this Article, I examine the text, history, and case law under
section five to develop a framework for considering whether legislation that
abrogates the states' sovereign immunity by providing for private suits for dam-
ages is within Congress's section five powers. I argue that section five legisla-
tion must satisfy the following four principles to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity when providing a private cause of action for damages. First,
Congress must explicitly abrogate state sovereign immunity if the legislation
infringes on a traditional and essential state function. Second, Congress must
create an ample record to justify the need for such legislation. Third,
Congress must be seeking to protect interests in an area in which the Court
has previously found that some genuine rights exist. This third principle, I
argue, primarily applies when Congress is seeking to enforce the Due Process
Clause, because genuine rights exist for all classes of persons under the Equal
Protection Clause. Fourth, Congress's enforcement efforts under section
five must not, themselves, violate another provision of the Constitution.
In Part II, I focus specifically on the fourth principle, because it most
frequently arises when Congress seeks to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause and, more specifically, has arisen in the lower courts in cases chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the ADA Title II. States typically argue
that legislation enacted under section five to protect the rights of certain
groups in our society under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause conflicts with the equal protection rights of nonprotected groups
under the equal protection guarantee found in the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 5 Because of the confusion stemming from the Court's case
law interpreting the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee and,
specifically, its affirmative action case law," this argument deserves serious
consideration. I argue that the mere fact that legislation relies, in part, on a
35. The Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, but the Court has
construed the Due Process Clause to contain an equal protection guarantee similar to the one
found in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See infra Part II.
36. The Court has waffled about what kind of affirmative action may violate the rights of
nonprotected class members, especially when the challenges have been brought under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (overruling prior precedent on the level of scrutiny required under the Fifth Amendment
for reverse discrimination challenges). For a discussion of the Court's current standard, see infra
Part II.
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"special protection" or "antisubordination"" perspective rather than on a
"color-blind" or "antidifferentiation 3 perspective does not mean that it
conflicts with the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee.
In Part III, I apply these principles to ADA Title 1I, arguing that Con-
gress has explicitly abrogated state sovereign immunity, has created a suffi-
cient legislative record to justify the need for the legislation, and is acting
on behalf of a group with genuine constitutional rights, and that ADA Title
1I's "special protection" rules do not result in a violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment's equal protection guarantee.
I. SECTION FIVE
A. Text of the Fourteenth Amendment
Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "The Con-
gress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article."39  Section five thus extends power to Congress to pass
"appropriate legislation" that "enforces" the Fourteenth Amendment. A
part of "this article" which section five gives Congress the power to enforce
is section one. 0 Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in
part, that "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."4 It proscribes what actions a state may take
that would deprive persons of the equal protection of the laws. It applies
when individuals sue the states for violating their right to the equal protec-
tion of the law.
Unlike section one, section five is not primarily a provision limiting
action by a governmental entity. Whereas section one begins with the lan-
guage "No State shall," section five begins with the language "The Congress
shall have power." While section one limits the powers of state govern-
ments, section five grants powers to Congress. As I argue below, the framers
and ratifiers of section five intended to give Congress broad powers to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause.
37. "Under the anti-subordination perspective, it is inappropriate for certain groups in
society to have subordinated status because of their lack of power in society as a whole." See Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003,
1007 (1986).
38. "Under the anti-differentiation perspective, it is inappropriate to treat individuals dif-
ferently on the basis of a particular normative view about race or sex." Id. at 1005.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
40. Sections two through four of the Fourteenth Amendment can also be enforced by Con-
gress. However, those sections are not relevant to this Article.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
B. History of Section Five
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment and proposed it to Congress after hearing testimony on condi-
tions in the South following the Civil War.42 This testimony revealed the
shocking reality that the ex-Confederate states were not willing to enforce
the laws against homicide and assault and battery to protect the interests of
recently freed African Americans. This failure of enforcement caused one
individual to testify, "That seems to me the worst indication of the state of
society there-worse than the fact that these things take place."'43
Not only did the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment enormously
distrust the states, but they also viewed the judiciary with considerable
skepticism. The judiciary had not formally favored abolitionists before the
Civil War. "There was consequently little inclination to bestow new pow-
ers on the judiciary, but rather to lean on an augmented power of Congress,
if it could be controlled."44
Professor Laurent Frantz used this historical material to argue that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to create a state action
requirement to limit Congress's powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.45
Although Professor Frantz may be correct in his historical view, the Supreme
Court has refused to adopt such a broad view of section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment.'
As we will see below, a more limited argument by Professor Frantz has
been accepted by the Supreme Court-that the framers did not intend to
limit the scope of Congress's powers under section five to situations that the
judiciary had already declared violated section one.47 Limiting Congress's
powers in that way would have made little historical sense, because the fram-
ers had little confidence in the judiciary's willingness to enforce section one.
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were wary of the judiciary,
because they were keenly aware of the judiciary's failure to respond to the
problem of slavery by refusing to protect the interests of slaves prior to the
42. See Frantz, supra note 21, at 1354.
43. Id. at 1355 (quoting the REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION
(Gov't Printing Office 1866)).
44. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 184 (Illinois
Studies in the Soc. Sciences Vol. 37, 1956).
45. See generally Frantz, supra note 21.
46. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (concluding that the Civil Rights Acts
cannot be justified under the Fourteenth Amendment, because the legislation was enacted under
section five but was not limited to prohibiting state action).
47. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,648 (1966).
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Civil War.' The Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford-in
which it concluded that a freed African American was not a citizen for pur-
poses of diversity jurisdiction-became the nation's symbol of the sharp
moral divide between the North and the South. The Court's decision fig-
ured prominently in the exchanges between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen
Douglas during their campaign for the United States Senate in 1858.50
Based on the widespread awareness of the Dred Scott decision and the evi-
dence gathered by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, "it is reasonable
to infer that not only in the Congress, but in the ratifying legislatures, the four-
teenth amendment was widely thought of as something which would empower
the Congress to deal effectively with the situation depicted in the testimony."51
The history of section five, therefore, suggests that the framers and
ratifiers did not intend merely to give Congress the power to outlaw what
the Supreme Court had already concluded was unconstitutional. Instead,
the framers saw section five as an important source of Congressional authority
to help protect the equality interests of the recently freed slaves. Although
commentators disagree about the proper scope of the state action require-
ment, no one disputes that the framers and ratifiers intended Congress to
have broader authority under section five than merely to enforce what the
Supreme Court had already decided was unconstitutional under section
one. As we will see, the Supreme Court's case law interpreting Congress's
power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause has been faithful to that
history. It has been particularly relevant to the Court's development of the
second of the four principles described below.
C. Case Law Under Section Five
Four principles can be derived from the Court's case law interpreting
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Explicit Abrogation
Under the explicit abrogation principle, Congress must use "plain lan-
guage" to express its intention to regulate state and local government if such
regulation intrudes on an essential state function.
48. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (holding unconstitu-
tional a state law designed to prevent slave owners from engaging in self-help to capture their fugi-
tive slaves).
49. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
50. See PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 211 (3d ed. 1992).
51. Frantz, supra note 21, at 1355.
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The explicit abrogation requirement stems from Gregory v. Ashcroft,52
which questioned whether Missouri's mandatory retirement age of seventy
years for its state court judges violated the ADEA." Three state court
judges filed suit against the governor of Missouri, arguing that the state had
violated the ADEA. The state defended the lawsuit by arguing that Mis-
souri's judges were not protected by the ADEA.
This case was decided before the Court ruled in Seminole Tribe v. Florida
that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to legis-
lation enacted under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 54 (The ADEA was
enacted under Congress's Commerce Clause powers.55) Nonetheless, the
Court stated that principles of federalism limit proper abrogation. The Court
questioned whether principles of federalism precluded coverage of state court
judges. Applying a "plain statement rule,"' 6 the Court said that federalism
principles require the Court to be "absolutely certain" that Congress intended
these "intrusive exercises""7 to "alter the usual constitutional balance between
the States and the Federal Government."58 While noting that section five
of the Fourteenth Amendment can provide Congress with additional
powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity-and the statute could arguably
also be justified under section five-the Court concluded that the plain
statement rule applies irrespective of whether Congress acts pursuant to the
Commerce Clause or section five if the statute "intrude[s] on state govern-
mental functions." 9 Because the Court concluded that the ADEA was too
ambiguous to permit application to state court judges, it found that it could
not meet the plain statement rule.'
In the Court's subsequent jurisprudence, it has continued to apply the
plain statement rule to legislation enacted pursuant to section five. But it
has also emphasized that the mere fact that legislation regulates state govern-
ment and provides for retrospective damages does not necessarily trigger the
plain statement rule. The legislation must also implicate principles of fed-
eralism by interfering with a core state function. Thus, in Pennsylvania
52. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
54. 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996); see also supra text accompanying note 27.
55. See William E. Thro, The Eleventh Amendment Revolution in the Lower Federal Courts, 25
J.C. & U.L. 501, 505 (1999).
56. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461.
57. Id. at 464.
58. Id. at 460-61 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985),
as cited in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)).
59. Id. at 470.
60. "In the face of such ambiguity, we will not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude
on state governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to its Commerce
Clause powers or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 470.
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Department of Corrections v. Yeskey 61-a case involving the issue of whether
state prisons are covered under ADA Title II-the Court noted that the
plain statement rule only applies to statutes that implicate the states' "sub-
stantial sovereign powers., 62 The Court said the appropriate question was
whether "exercising ultimate control over the management of state
prisons, like establishing the qualifications of state government officials, is
a traditional and essential state function subject to the plain-statement
rule of Gregory."63 Assuming that the legislation did interfere with a core
state function, the Court found that the plain statement requirement was
met.
The Supreme Court again considered the explicit abrogation require-
ment this term under the ADEA in Kime/. 6' Although Eleventh Circuit
Judge Edmondson had concluded that the explicit abrogation requirement
had not been satisfied under the ADEA,65 the Supreme Court rejected
that conclusion. In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer on the explicit abrogation requirement, the Court concluded
that Congress made its intentions "unmistakably clear" through the
language it adopted. 6 The Supreme Court has therefore rejected the more
rigorous explicit abrogation rule proposed by Judge Edmondson.67  As I
argue in Part III.B, ADA Title II easily satisfies the explicit abrogation
requirement.
61. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
62. Id. at 209 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61).
63. Id.
64. Kimel is a consolidated appeal from three lower court cases involving state sovereign
immunity under the ADEA. In two of the three ADEA cases, the lower courts concluded that
Congress effectively abrogated state sovereign immunity; in the third case, the lower court
found that the ADEA was passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause, rather than section five,
and therefore under the decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), did not
provide a proper basis for abrogation of state sovereign immunity. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text; see also MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785 (N.D.
Ala. 1996).
65. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1432 (11th Cir.), affd, Nos. 98-
791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2000). Judge Cox also agreed that the ADEA did not
properly abrogate state sovereign immunity, but his decision did not depend on the abrogation
argument. He concluded that the ADEA was beyond Congress's enforcement powers because its
rigor exceeded the requirements of the rational basis test and its use of a disparate impact theory
was inconsistent with the Court's prior holdings that equal protection violations require proof of
intent. See id. at 1447-48.
66. See Kimel, 2000 WL 14165, at *8-'10.
67. Only Justices Thomas and Kennedy accepted a more rigorous explicit abrogation rule
in Kimel. See id. at *21 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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2. Importance of Fact Finding
Under the second principle, the Court will defer to Congress's conclu-
sion that legislation is enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment only
if Congress creates an adequate legislative record.
This principle emerges from the Supreme Court's decision in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach.68 In that case, the Court found that Congress had
the power under the Voting Rights Act to suspend literacy tests in the
South under section two of the Fifteenth Amendment69 even though the
Supreme Court had unanimously ruled in 1959 in Lassiter v. Northampton
Board of Elections7" that such tests were constitutional. (The Supreme Court
has always considered the scope of section two of the Fifteenth Amendment
to be identical to the scope of section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because the language and history of the sections is virtually identical.7") In
reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that section two of the
Fifteenth Amendment was intended to enlarge the remedial powers of Con-
gress. It also readily distinguished Lassister by saying that Congress had ample
evidence of a constitutional violation when it enacted the Voting Rights Act
in response to specific practices by southern states. It interpreted the "appro-
priate legislation" requirement to mean that "Congress may use any rational
means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting,"72 so long as it has laid a sufficient factual basis for the legislation.
The Supreme Court similarly interpreted Congress's power broadly
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,
73
the Supreme Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of a provi-
sion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that stated that any person who has
successfully completed sixth grade in an American school in which the
predominant language is other than English shall not be disqualified from
voting under any literacy test because of an inability to read or write English.
The voters of New York argued that Congress only had the power to use its
section five powers to prohibit conduct that the judiciary would find vio-
74lated section one.
68. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
69. Section two of the Fifteenth Amendment has similar language to that of section five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Section two reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
70. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
71. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
72. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324.
73. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
74. See id. at 648.
The Court firmly rejected that argument, concluding that "section five
is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."75 It focused on the "appro-
priate legislation" requirement under section five to determine whether
Congress could have reasonably considered the Voting Rights Act to be an
enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Congress justified the
Voting Rights Act under the Equal Protection Clause by claiming that
"enhanced political power [for the Puerto Rican community] will be helpful
in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the entire
Puerto Rican community."76 In an extremely deferential statement, the Court
said: "It is not for us to review the congressional resolution [of these com-
peting considerations] .... It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis
upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."77 Again,
Congress's factual record was central to the Court's willingness to tolerate
Congress's creating standards beyond those previously established by the
Court pursuant to section one.
The importance of fact finding in supporting Congress's section five
authority continues to be emphasized by the Court. In Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank," the Court con-
cluded that "Congress came up with little evidence of infringing conduct
on the part of the States" to justify the Patent Remedy Act. 9 "The Federal
75. Id. at 651.
76. Id. at 652.
77. Id. at 653.
78. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
79. Id. at 2207. The issue in Florida Prepaid was whether the lower court should have
granted the agency's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 2204. The
lower court and appellate courts both found that proper subject matter jurisdiction was present,
because the Patent Remedy Act was properly enacted pursuant to Congress's section five powers.
See id. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Patent Remedy Act could not be justified
under section five. See id. Although College Savings Bank had sought injunctive and declaratory
relief, as well as damages, the Court did not consider whether the lawsuit could be nonetheless main-
tained as a suit solely for injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young, although Justice Breyer assumed the
continued vitality of Ex Parte Young in his dissent in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Education Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2239-40 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I
recognize the possibility that Congress may achieve its objectives in other ways. Ex Parte Young
is still available, though effective only where damages remedies are not important." (citation
omitted)). The question of the continued vitality of an Ex Parte Young theory is complicated and
beyond the scope of this Article. Compare Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2262-63 (1999)
(mentioning Ex Parte Young with approval), with Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261
(1997), and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (refusing to permit a suit for injunctive
relief under Ex Parte Young after also concluding that state sovereign immunity had not been
properly abrogated for retrospective damages relief). It does not appear that College Savings Bank
sought to use an Ex Parte Young theory to preserve its right to seek declaratory and injunctive
relief.
668 47 UCLA LAW REVIEW 653 (2000)
Circuit in its opinion identified only eight patent-infringement suits prose-
cuted against the States in the 110 years between 1880 and 1990."0 That
kind of evidence was insufficient to satisfy principle number two.
The importance of Congressional fact finding was also central to the
Court's decision in Kimel. The Court found that the fact that the ADEA
prohibits very little conduct likely to be held unconstitutional, while
significant, does not alone provide the answer to our § 5 inquiry.
Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies, and
we have never held that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting rea-
sonably prophylactic legislation. Our task is to determine whether the
ADEA is in fact just such an appropriate remedy or, instead, merely
an attempt to substantively redefine the States' legal obligations with
respect to age discrimination. One means by which we have made
such a determination in the past is by examining the legislative record
containing the reasons for Congress' action."
The ADEA failed to meet this standard, because the Court found that "Con-
gress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much
less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional
violation." 2
The Kimel decision suggests that the second requirement has grown in
importance. Even if Congress is proceeding on a doubtful constitutional basis
(as in the age discrimination area), the Courts may defer to Congress's sec-
tion five powers if it creates a strong legislative record for the need for
prophylactic legislative measures. This is the first time that the Court has
hinted that sufficient findings of fact by Congress can overcome other con-
stitutional difficulties under section five.
3. Enforcing a Protected Right
Under the third principle, Congress can only enforce a right that is
genuinely protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The third principle emerges from City of Boeme v. Flores,s" in which
the Court considered whether Congress had the constitutional authority
80. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207.
81. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, Nos. 98-791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165, at *16 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 2000).
82. Id.
83. 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997). The Archdiocese of St. Peter Catholic Church sought to
take advantage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to obtain a building permit to
expand its facility. When the city denied the request, it brought suit under the RFRA. The city
defended its zoning decision by arguing that the RFRA was unconstitutional because it exceeded
Congress's enforcement authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court agreed with the city, concluding that the RFRA was unconstitutional.
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under section five to create a private right of action against state actors
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).' The con-
stitutional violation that Congress sought to enforce in the RFRA was the
First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause as incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."
The backdrop to the Court's section five analysis in City of Boerne was
its earlier decision in Employment Division v. Smith." There the Court held
that the Free Exercise Clause allows the government to prohibit, without
justification, conduct mandated by an individual's religious beliefs, so long
as that prohibition is generally applicable to all persons.87 In Smith, the
Court went so far as to state that the Free Exercise Clause had no applica-
tion at all to a situation in which a generally applicable law burdened
religious practice. The Court did not merely reject the strict scrutiny test
suggested by the plaintiffs, but suggested that only a very low level of scru-
tiny, if any, applies to such claims."
Congress was not satisfied with the decision in Smith and sought to
overturn the decision by enacting the RFRA. The RFRA required the courts
to use a strict scrutiny test when laws of general applicability had a disparate
impact on religious expression. The Supreme Court struck down the RFRA
and cited two legislative shortcomings to support its conclusion. First, Con-
gress failed to create an adequate legislative record to demonstrate that such
legislation was necessary to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Second,
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). The RFRA prohibits the government
from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability unless the government can demonstrate that the burden: "(1) is in further
ance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest." Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
85. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (deciding that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause).
86. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
87. The Court's justification for its decision was that a higher standard of scrutiny for gen-
eral laws would have an impact on religious expression and
would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obli-
gations of almost every conceivable kind-ranging from compulsory military service... to
the payment of taxes ... to health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child
neglect laws .... The First Amendment's protection of religious liberty does not require
this.
Id. at 888-89 (citations omitted).
88. See id. at 878 ("It is a permissible reading of the text... to say that if prohibiting the
exercise of religion ... is not the object [of the state policy] ... but merely the incidental effect of
a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended."); see also id. at 885 ("We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach
in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the [strict scrutiny] test inapplicable
to such challenges.").
89. "RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of generally applicable
laws passed because of religious bigotry. The history of persecution in this country detailed in the
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"regardless of the state of the legislative record," the Court concluded that
the RFRA was unconstitutional because it created a strict scrutiny standard
where the Supreme Court had previously concluded that little or no scrutiny
was appropriate.' The Court described this second problem as even "more
serious" than the first problem, suggesting that no amount of legislative
hearings could give Congress the power to "attempt a substantive change in
constitutional protections."91 Thus, the Court concluded that the RFRA was
"substantive" rather than "enforcement" legislation.92 Because laws of general
applicability simply did not create free exercise problems, the Court con-
cluded that the RFRA fell on the substantive side of the enforcement/
substantive distinction.93
In its most recent state sovereign immunity cases involving non-civil
rights issues, the Supreme Court has continued to emphasize that Congress
does not have the right to enact enforcement legislation for nonfundamen-
tal rights. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board,94 the Court concluded that the property-based due process
rights alleged to justify the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act did not exist,
so that Congress had little or no enforcement power under section five.95
This third principle has rarely been used to strike down legislation
designed to enforce the Equal Protection Clause but has been used several
hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 530 (1997).
90. The Court concluded that the RFRA attempts "a substantive change in constitutional
protections." Id. at 532.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. But the Court has arguably softened its statement from Smith as to which type of prob-
lem was "more serious." In Kimel, the Court emphasized that it should examine the legislative record
to understand the justifications for Congress's actions even if Congress is attempting to "prohibit]
very little conduct likely to be held unconstitutional." Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, Nos. 98-
791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165, at "16 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2000). It called the problem of Congress
seeking to prohibit constitutional conduct as "significant" but did not use Smith's "more serious"
language. Id.
94. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
95. See id. at 2225 ("Unsurprisingly, petitioner points to no decision of this Court (or of
any other court, for that matter) recognizing a property right in freedom from a competitor's false
advertising about its own products."). The legal issue in College Savings Bank was whether the federal
courts had jurisdiction to consider a lawsuit against the state pursuant to the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act. See id. at 2222. College Savings Bank had brought suit against the state under
that act, and the lower courts had concluded that they did not have subject matter jurisdiction
because the statute did not constitutionally abrogate state sovereign immunity. See id. at 2223.
The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act could not
be justified under section five. See id. It did not consider whether the lawsuit could be maintained as
a suit solely for injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young. The question of the continued vitality of
an Ex Parte Young theory is complicated and beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 79.
times to strike down legislation designed to enforce the Due Process Clause.
Why does this contrast occur?
An easy answer is that Congress has simply done a better procedural
job justifying civil rights legislation than other legislation.96 It has held hear-
ings and crafted legislation to respond to an important social problem in the
civil rights area. Given the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, this
deference would appear to be particularly appropriate when Congress has
sought to protect African Americans from racial discrimination. As discussed
above, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment envisioned Congress as
having a more important role in this context than the judiciary or the states.
The Court's decisions have been faithful to that historical understanding.
That explanation, however, is not satisfactory, because City of Boerne
states clearly that the RFRA's "most serious shortcoming," which was a prob-
lem "regardless of the state of the legislative record," was that it made a
"substantive change in constitutional protections."97 The difference between
the due process and equal protection cases actually arises from the fact that
little or no constitutional protection exists in the due process area for
nonfundamental rights. Because little or no constitutional protection exists,
Congress has no enforcement authority to enact legislation of any sort to
enforce nonfundamental due process rights. It does not matter whether
Congress creates a legislative record, because it does not have legislative
power in that field to enact legislation that regulates the states and provides
for a private damages remedy. Thus, Congress did not have the power to
enact the RFRA, because the Supreme Court had previously concluded
in Smith that the judiciary had no proper role in examining the validity of
general laws that had a disparate impact on religious practice. Such laws
need not be evaluated under a rational basis test, a balancing test, or a strict
scrutiny test.98 Similarly, in College Savings Bank, Congress had no enforce-
ment authority at all to abrogate state immunity under the Trademark Rem-
96. See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S.
Ct. 2199, 2207. (1999) ("Unlike the undisputed record of racial discrimination confronting Con-
gress in the voting rights cases, Congress came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on the
part of the States." (citation omitted)).
97. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531-32.
98. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social impor-
tance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
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edy Clarification Act, because there is no "property right in freedom from a
competitor's false advertising about its own products."'
Other commentators might disagree with my characterization of sub-
stantive due process as providing strict scrutiny for fundamental rights and
little or no scrutiny for nonfundamental rights. They would argue that the
rational basis test always applies under the Due Process Clause for nonfun-
damental rights, which could give rise to Congress's enforcement power
under section five.'0° Yet, even Professor Scott Bice, who has written the
two most significant articles on the importance of rational basis review in
constitutional law, acknowledges that the view that the Due Process Clause
always allows for at least rational basis review "adds little if any substantive
content to the due process clauses..''. Consistent with Professor Bice's obser-
vation, I have not been able to find any substantive due process cases in
which the Court has struck down state legislation under rational basis
scrutiny. In fact, Williamson v. Lee Optical '2 is one of the last cases to invoke
explicitly a rational basis standard in the due process area. In upholding a
state statute that greatly harmed the business interests of opticians and
optometrists, while benefiting ophthalmologists, the Court said that "[tihe
day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought."' 3 The rational basis test under the Due
Process Clause might therefore be described as "de facto no scrutiny at all."' 4
The problem of a lack of substantive enforcement power rarely occurs,
however, when Congress seeks to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. For
suspect classes, it is obvious that Congress has significant enforcement
power, because the history of the Fourteenth Amendment amply demon-
strates that the framers intended Congress to enact legislation to protect
99. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2225.
100. See, e.g., Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1,
2-3 (1980) [hereinafter Bice, Rationality Analysis] ("Courts often require that legislation must be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. This 'rational basis test' is commonly said
to be the minimum standard of judicial review-the standard that all legislation must meet to sur-
vive constitutional attack, whether challenged under the due process clause or the equal protec-
tion clause." (citations omitted)); Scott H. Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 707 (1977) [hereinafter Bice, Standards
of Judicial Review] ("The central issue in substantive due process is determining what counts as an
'adequate justification.' The minimum protection view is that a deprivation is justified so long as it is
accomplished pursuant to a validly enacted law.").
101. Bice, Standards of Judicial Review, supra note 100, at 707 n.86.
102. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
103. Id. at 488.
104. This phrase was suggested by my colleague Professor Alan Michaels in a conversation
with me about this Article.
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the interests of those groups. Thus, when Congress has sought to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause to protect the equality interests of African Ameri-
cans, no court has questioned whether it has that underlying enforcement
power.
Further, Congress even has residual enforcement power for nonsuspect
classes, because the Equal Protection Clause provides meaningful protection
to all classes of persons. The Court's history of decisions for nonsuspect
classes reveals that meaningful constitutional rights exist in the equal pro-
tection context even for nonsuspect groups. For instance, in Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia,'5 the Court concluded that the plaintiffs
could make a claim of age-based discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. Although they lost on the merits, the Court did have to consider
thoughtfully whether their claim of age discrimination was valid. Similarly,
in Romer v. Evans,1"6 the plaintiffs had standing to make a successful equal
protection claim even though the Court has failed to accord suspect class
status to gay men and lesbians. Finally, the disabled plaintiffs in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.' 7 had the right to go forward with
their equal protection claim even though the Court accorded them nonsus-
pect class status. Not only did they go forward, but the Court concluded
that they should prevail under that standard. Thus, the nonsuspect class
label does not deprive a group of the right to equal protection of the laws.
It merely affects the framework that the Court uses in assessing its claim of
discrimination under section one.
There is even a textual reason for the rational basis standard to be
more meaningful in the context of the Equal Protection Clause than the Due
Process Clause. The Equal Protection Clause provides nondiscrimination pro-
tection to all "persons." Whereas the Court has had to determine for itself
what categories of claims deserve protection under an illusory "due process"
standard with little or no textual guidance,"8 the language of the Equal
Protection Clause suggests that all persons are entitled to make claims
involving their right to equal protection. Congress therefore always has a
legitimate textual basis for invoking the Equal Protection Clause irrespective
of whether a group is entitled to "suspect class" treatment. It is impossible
to say that any federal antidiscrimination legislative measure is not seeking
105. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
106. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
107. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
108. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("The foregoing cases
suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of pri-
vacy." (citation omitted)).
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to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment so long as Congress has created a
legitimate record that antidiscrimination legislation is necessary.
The Court's recent decision in Kimel is not to the contrary. The Court
recognized the breadth of Congress's power under section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment when it stated:
Congress' § 5 power is not confined to the enactment of legislation
that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rather, Congress' power "to enforce" the Amendment includes the
authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed
thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct,
including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's
109
text.
It then engaged in a serious examination of whether the ADEA's prohibi-
tion against discrimination exceeded this latitude to prohibit a "somewhat
broader swath of conduct" than expressly prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The broad reach of the ADEA, coupled with limited Con-
gressional findings of discrimination by state actors, however, led the Court
to conclude that "Congress' 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem.""'
Nonetheless, the Kimel case does reflect the first time that the Court
has concluded that Congress exceeded its authority when seeking to enforce
an equal protection guarantee. But it drew that conclusion after taking Con-
gress's powers more seriously than it has in recent cases involving the Due
Process Clause. For example, in Florida Prepaid, a case involving a property
interest protected under the Due Process Clause, the Court stated "petitioner
points to no decision of this Court (or of any other court, for that matter)
recognizing a property right in freedom from a competitor's false advertising
about its own products."''. Finding that no right even existed, it did not ask
the "broader swath of conduct" question in Florida Prepaid that it later asked
in Kimel."' Thus, Kimel does support the argument that the Court will offer
more deference to Congress when it seeks to enforce the Equal Protection
109. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, Nos. 98-791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165, at *12 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 2000).
110. Id. at *16.
111. College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2225
(1999).
112. See id.
Finding that there is no deprivation of property at issue here, we need not pursue the
follow-on question that City of Boerne would otherwise require us to resolve: whether the
prophylactic measure taken under purported authority of § 5 (viz., prohibition of States'
sovereign-immunity claims, which are not in themselves a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment) was genuinely necessary to prevent violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Clause than when it seeks to enforce the Due Process Clause, even if that
equal protection interest only garners a low-level rational basis test under
section one.
The fact that the enforcement threshold is not a significant hurdle for
legislation designed to protect a group's equality interests, however, does not
mean that section five gives Congress a blank check in the equal protection
context to abrogate state sovereign immunity. It must still satisfy principle
number four.
4. Violation of Another Constitutional Right
Under the fourth principle, legislation enacted pursuant to section five
must not violate another constitutional right, because it would then fail the
"appropriate legislation" requirement under section five.
This principle emerged in Katzenbach v. Morgan."' The respondents
argued that the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional under section five,
because it
works an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment by prohibiting the enforcement of the English literacy require-
ment only for those educated in American-flag schools ... in which
the language of instruction was other than English, and not for those
educated in schools beyond the territorial limits of the United States
in which the language of instruction was also other than English."'
In other words, the respondents argued that the Voting Rights Act violated
another provision of the Constitution-the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme
Court acknowledged that it would be inappropriate for section five legisla-
tion to violate another provision of the Constitution but concluded that no
such violation had occurred in this case, because the statute in question did
not directly harm anyone. It did not restrict or deny the franchise. It was
merely a "reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier to the exer-
cise of the franchise."
'' 5
Although the Supreme Court's explanation of why it rejected this
argument was not extensive, the fourth principle emerges from that dis-
cussion. The Court stated that courts do have a responsibility to make sure
that legislation is "appropriate" by being consistent with the "letter and the
spirit of the [C]onstitution."' 16 The legislation at issue was appropriate,
113. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
114. Id. at 656.
115. Id. at 657.
116. Id. at 651 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
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despite the fact that it drew distinctions between groups, because those dis-
tinctions did not themselves violate the equal protection guarantees of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The fourth principle has not been paramount in previous section five
cases. But, as I argue below, it may be pivotal in determining whether Con-
gress has exceeded its authority in enacting ADA Title II, because the statute
provides some "special protection rules," like the reasonable accommoda-
tion requirement, that arguably have some impact on the rights of others.
The application of the fourth principle is also difficult to assess, because it is
not easy to determine whether Congress, in fact, is violating a constitutional
right outside of the Fourteenth Amendment when it seeks to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. A framework for making that determination is dis-
cussed in Part II.
II. THE FOURTH PRINCIPLE RE-EXAMINED: VIOLATIONS OF THE
"LETTER OR SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION"
A. Introduction
In theory, Congress could violate nearly any provision contained in the
Bill of Rights-it could restrict speech,' deprive an individual of his or her
right to bear arms,"' seize the property of an individual,"9 deprive a person
of his or her right to a trial, 20 or impose excessive bail' 21-while seeking to
protect the equality rights of certain groups in our society under section
five. In practice, all the cases challenging Congress's power to enact civil
rights legislation have questioned whether that legislation violated the
equal protection guarantee found in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.'22
Whether a statute violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee is a difficult question to answer because of the confusion emanating
from the Court's Fifth Amendment and affirmative action jurisprudence.
Until the 1950s, the Supreme Court did not consider the Fifth Amendment
even to impose an equal protection requirement and certainly did not
117. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
118. See U.S. CONST. amend. II.
119. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
120. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
121. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
122. See, e.g., Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 33 F. Supp. 2d 668 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Garrett v.
Board of Trustees, 989 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ala. 1998); Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. N.C.
1996), aff d, 131 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated on odier grounds, 119 S. Ct. 33 (1998) (mem.). For
further discussion, see infra Part III.A.
understand it to impose a standard that was identical to the standard found
in section one of the Fourteenth Amendment. The text of these clauses
supports this view. The Fifth Amendment does not reference equal protec-
tion at all; it says that "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." '23 Section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment, by contrast, states that "No State shall.., deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." '24
As recently as 1943, the Court said that "[u]nlike the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Fifth contains no equal protection clause and it provides
no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress." '125 In the first
Japanese curfew case, the Court only required the federal government to
defend its curfew under rational basis scrutiny.126 Even in the infamous
Korematsu' 7 case, in which the Court purported to invoke "the most rigid
scrutiny," the Court's holding and reference to the previous Japanese curfew
case suggest that it was not applying a rigorous scrutiny at all. 2
In the 1950s, however, the Court began to raise the level of scrutiny
for racial classifications under the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guar-
antee to equal the standards embodied in section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment. These standards became explicitly equivalent in 1995 when
the Court stated in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena'29 that "we hold today
that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny. '' "°
Whether the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee has been
violated has thus come to depend largely upon the meaning of section one's
Equal Protection Clause. Because the Supreme Court did not render the
decision in Adarand until 1995, and fewer cases are filed against Congress
for violating the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee than are
filed against the fifty states for violating the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection guarantee, most of the cases that can provide guidance on the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee will be Four-
teenth Amendment cases.
These equality cases, however, are only relevant in this context for
determining when Congress has violated the "appropriate legislation"
123. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
125. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943).
126. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943).
127. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
128. See id. at 216-19.
129. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
130. Id. at 227.
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requirement by exceeding its maximum authority under section five through
the creation of an invidious classification that itself violates the Fifth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee. An example might help clarify
how the equality jurisprudence should and should not enter the section five
appropriate legislation analysis.
For example, let us assume that Congress passes legislation that
requires 10 percent of the contractors on state projects to be "minority-
owned" businesses.13' Further, let us assume that this legislation provides a
private right of action for damages for qualified minority-owned businesses
if they are denied a state contract when the state has not met its 10 percent
requirement. Under the circumstances, let us suppose that a qualified
minority-owned business, which was not hired to perform a contract, sues a
state for failing to comply with this requirement. The state defends this
action by arguing that Congress's legislation exceeded its enforcement
authority under section five, because the legislation violated the constitu-
tional rights of nonprotected class members under the Fifth Amendment's
equal protection guarantee. Assuming the legislation met the first two
principles, the Court's equality jurisprudence would be relevant for deter-
mining whether Congress had exceeded its enforcement authority by cre-
ating legislation that, itself, violated another provision of the Constitution
such as the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. The Supreme
Court has held that affirmative action can only be required if very stringent
criteria are met; it is unlikely that this hypothetical legislation would meet
those requirements.3
By contrast, let us assume that Congress enacts race discrimination
legislation that permits proof of disproportionate impact as a theory for state
liability for damages, rather than proof of intentional discrimination. An
131. See, e.g., id. (invalidating a federal law that required a subcontracting clause that
favored certain minority groups); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)
(invalidating a city ordinance that required construction contracts to subcontract at least 30 percent
of the dollar amount of each contract to one or more "[mlinority [b]usiness [elnterprises").
132. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235 (concluding that a minority subcontracting preference
must satisfy strict scrutiny); Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-500 (concluding that the city failed to demon-
strate a compelling governmental interest to justify the 30 percent minority requirement). Other
commentators have argued that the Supreme Court has improperly interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to invalidate such affirmative action plans. See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Affirmative
Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 789-98 (1985);
Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2413 (1994); cf. T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and
Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 963 (suggesting that Justice Harlan supported affirmative
action despite his infamous statement that the Constitution must be "color-blind"). Although
these commentators' arguments may stem from a correct historical and normative reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment, for the purposes of this Article, I am going to assume the validity of the
affirmative action jurisprudence.
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African American plaintiff sues the state for using a nonvalid'33 testing
instrument that disproportionately excludes damages for African Americans
from a particular job category. The state defends this lawsuit by saying that
Congress exceeded its enforcement authority under section five in enacting
the race discrimination legislation. Although the Supreme Court has held
that evidence of intent must be established to demonstrate a violation of
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment,134 I would argue that this legis-
lation is consistent with the fourth principle. It complies with the fourth
principle because it is not unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment for
Congress to create a disparate impact theory. The disparate impact theory,
itself, does not violate the constitutional rights of others. Thus, it complies
with the fourth principle.1
6
The important question that arises then is: When might legislation
enacted by Congress to enforce the Equal Protection Clause violate the
equality rights of others? That problem is most likely to arise in the affirma-
tive action context in which special protection rights for one group arguably
collide with the equality rights of another group. Nonetheless, it is wrong
to conclude that all special protection legislation enacted pursuant to section
five is unconstitutional. It is possible for special protection legislation not
to infringe the equality interests of others.
B. History of the Equal Protection Clause
Although some commentators might argue that any legislation that
deviates from the pure color-blind or antidifferentiation framework by grant-
ing special protection or antisubordination rights violates the guarantee to
133. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994).
134. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
135. To pass constitutional muster, the legislation would also have to be consistent with the
other three principles. One would want to know whether Congress held sufficient hearings to
demonstrate that nonintentional discrimination by state actors was a problem before enacting
that theory of liability. As I have argued above, Congress typically conducts ample legislative
hearings before enacting civil rights legislation. The disparate impact theory contained within
Title VII appears to conform to that pattern. See Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 4 F.
Supp. 2d 1092, 1110 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (concluding that "Title VII's legislative history reflects
that the premise of the act was societally widespread and longstanding intentional discrimination
against African-Americans, the deep-rooted effects of which could not be adequately addressed
merely by a ban on intentional discrimination").
136. Supreme Court precedent under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment and section
two of the Fifteenth Amendment is consistent with this assessment. See City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) ("In the present case, we hold that the [Voting Rights] Act's ban
on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is an appropriate method of promoting the
purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment, even if it is assumed that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits
only intentional discrimination in voting.").
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equal protection,'37 I argue below that such a position is inconsistent with
the history and case law under the Equal Protection Clause.
The history of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that the ratifying
Congress of 1868 was well aware of the debate between the antidifferentia-
tion and antisubordination'3 s perspectives. As we will see below, it endorsed
both principles but particularly endorsed the antisubordination principle as
reflected in its discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment and the contem-
poraneous special protection legislation that it considered appropriate and
necessary for African Americans.
As Professor Eric Schnapper has persuasively argued in his careful his-
torical examination of the Fourteenth Amendment, the ratifying Congress
considered the basic purpose of this amendment to be "the amelioration of
the condition of the freedmen."'39 Similarly, in enacting legislative relief
measures at the same time, Congress passed some relief measures that were
only available to African Americans and passed other legislation that would
provide relief both to whites and to African Americans. The debate between
the antisubordination and antidifferentiation theories was alive in the halls
of Congress, as evidenced by President Johnson's veto of special treatment
legislation on the ground that it permitted Congress to prefer "a portion of
the people, discriminating against all others."'" Congress rejected those
arguments and overrode the veto." '
All the special protection legislation passed by the 1865 Congress
involved situations in which African Americans were not awarded prefer-
ences in a way that unduly burdened identifiable whites. The various
statutes that accorded special protection to African Americans gave them
provisions, clothing, and fuel, as well as the opportunity to lease or purchase
137. The argument that the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit affirmative action is
primarily a textual argument, not a historical argument, based on the language of section one but
ignoring the language of section five. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 603-04 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing for the color-blind
principle from the text and case law under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not discussing the
ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200. Because
the predominant and better view of constitutional interpretation is that it should rely on more than
mere textual arguments, I have rejected that alternative for the purposes of this Article. As Chief
Justice Marshall said many years ago, "it is a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). A pure textual approach may be a persuasive argument for
interpreting legislation, but it is not an appropriate argument for interpreting a Constitution.
138. For definitions of these perspectives, see supra notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text.
139. Schnapper, supra note 132, at 785 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459
(1866) (statement by Rep. Stevens)).
140. Id. at 775 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3840 (1866) (statement by Sen.
Saulsbury)).
141. See id. at 775.
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certain land.'42 Because of their history of slavery, African Americans were
considered entitled to these programs in order to ameliorate their prior
condition. Nonetheless, when a severe crop failure in the South caused
widespread famine, Congress passed relief legislation that was available to
individuals of all races. Congress therefore continually wrestled with the
limits of the antisubordination principle. It struggled with determining at
what point the special protection rights that were available to African
Americans, if not also extended to whites, would result in whites' being
treated unfairly.
How the Congress of 1868 would react to the examples of reverse dis-
crimination that the Supreme Court has handled in the last couple of dec-
ades143 is hard to determine from these examples of legislation passed by the
1868 Congress. Nonetheless, it is clear that special protection benefits that
did not unduly burden the interests of whites were considered permissible
by the 1868 Congress. Because not all forms of special protection result in
harm or disadvantage to others, we can readily conclude that the 1868
Congress would have favored some forms of special protection legislation
appropriate for groups with a genuine need for assistance. Based on the
statements and legislation from the 1868 Congress, it is erroneous to describe
the 1868 Congress as having a pure antidifferentiation mindset. The 1868
Congress did not anticipate the Fourteenth Amendment's becoming a tool
to strike down the special protection legislation that it considered desirable
for African Americans.
Although we can generally draw the antidifferentiation and antisubor-
dination principles from the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, we can-
not draw a precise framework for accommodating those principles from
history alone. The Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence-which I
discuss next-offers important insight into how these principles can coexist.
144
C. Equal Protection Jurisprudence
1. Race and Gender Discrimination
The scope of protection found in the Equal Protection Clause is not
easy to resolve, because two lines of Supreme Court precedent sometimes
142. See id. at 760.
143. See infra Part I.C (discussing reverse discrimination cases).
144. Although I do not agree on a normative basis that the Supreme Court's delineation of
the appropriate standard in Fourteenth Amendment cases is the best possible framework, see gen.
era!!y Colker, supra note 37, it is not the purpose of this Article to challenge that framework so long
as it is a plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's text and history.
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conflict with each other. First, the Court has carved out levels of scrutiny
under an antisubordination model, reflecting the differing histories of dis-
crimination that certain subgroups in our society have experienced.14
Next, the court has recognized an antidifferentiation model of equality
under which discrimination against whites is considered to be as problem-
atic as discrimination against African Americans.46  These two lines of
precedent can generally be reconciled to mean that the Court recognizes
that both antidifferentiation and antisubordination models can cohabit
under the Equal Protection Clause so long as special protection legislation
does not unduly burden the interests of others. It is misguided to argue from
this precedent that special protection legislation can never survive an equal
protection challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The development of the suspect class rubric reflects the antisubor-
dination perspective. This perspective can be readily found in the well-known
footnote four in which Justice Stone, writing for the majority in United States
v. Carolene Products,'47 stated that a more stringent standard of review might
be appropriate in certain cases in which "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to pro-
tect minorities."'4 s  The early strict scrutiny cases involved African
American"' or Asian American ° plaintiffs who faced subordinating treat-
ment.51  Although the most famous of these cases-Brown v. Board of
Education-is well-known for its antidifferentiation principle that "[sleparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal,"'' 2 the case was also embedded
145. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for a definition of the antisubordination
perspective.
146. See supra note 38 and accompanying text for a definition of the antidifferentiation
perspective.
147. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
148. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
149. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443-44 (1968) (holding that
racially segregated housing is unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding
that a statute prohibiting interracial marriage is unconstitutional); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racially segregated schools are unconstitutional).
150. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that an order
excluding U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry from certain militarily significant areas during World
War II was constitutional).
151. See, e.g., id. at 216 ("It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.").
152. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Another equally famous phrase used to support the antidiffer-
entiation perspective is Justice Harlan's statement in dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), that "[olur Constitution is color-blind." Read in context, however,
that phrase also supports an antisubordination perspective. Justice Harlan, in fact, said: "But in
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in a strong concern about the "feeling of inferiority"1 3 that had been incul-
cated in African American children through racial segregation. The racially
segregating policies at issue in Brown equally deprived whites and African
Americans of an integrated education, yet the Supreme Court never con-
templated how this breach of the equality principle harmed whites. The
focus on the harm to African Americans was consistent with the antisub-
ordination thesis that underlay the Court's early development of the strict
scrutiny framework in section one cases.
154
When the Supreme Court developed heightened scrutiny in the gender
context, it continued to employ the antisubordination framework. It justified
the development of heightened scrutiny through reference to the history of
discrimination against women in our society. The first case in which the
Supreme Court explicitly invoked heightened scrutiny for a gender classi-
fication involved a claim brought by a married couple who challenged a
gender-specific rule in the armed forces. ' A plurality of the Court applied
heightened scrutiny and explained:
[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our
society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the
pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold
office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married
women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey
property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children.156
The Court soon applied a heightened scrutiny standard to gender discrimi-
nation cases brought by male plaintiffs.'57 Only Justice Rehnquist paused to
view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant,
ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." For further discussion, see generally Aleinikoff, supra
note 132.
153. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
154. For further discussion of the Court's development of its equal protection jurisprudence,
see Colker, supra note 37, at 1016-28.
155. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
156. Id. at 685 (invalidating an armed services' rule that provided that married women
could receive an extra stipend to support their families only if they could establish their husbands'
financial dependence upon them). Because this case was brought against the federal government, it
technically derived from the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which has been interpreted
to include an equal protection principle comparable to the one found in section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Frontiero, the Court applied the framework developed in previous
section one cases even though it noted that this case was brought under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 679.
157. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976) (granting the relief sought by a male
challenging an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2 percent beer to males under the
age of 21 and to females under the age of 18); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974) (denying
a widower's challenge to a state property tax exemption that was available only to widows, blind
persons, or totally and permanently disabled persons). The formulation of heightened scrutiny is
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ask whether heightened scrutiny should apply to a group without a history
of discrimination.158
This relatively noncontroversial move from having heightened scrutiny
apply only to cases involving women to having it apply to cases involving
men was possible because these cases did not involve affirmative action.
Whether men could purchase beer"59 or take advantage of property tax relier'6
did not directly affect the rights or interests of women. Because no conflict
existed between the antidifferentiation and antisubordination approaches
in these cases, the Court could embrace both perspectives simultaneously.
California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra' best reflected the
possible cohabitation of antidifferentiation and antisubordination principles.
It questioned whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) preempted
"a state statute that requires employers to provide leave and reinstatement
to employees disabled by pregnancy" but not to employees suffering from
other disabilities.
162
The language of the PDA supports an antidifferentiation model. It states
in relevant part that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work."'
63
The Supreme Court, however, looked beyond the language to conclude that
the purpose of the PDA was to create a "floor beneath which pregnancy
disability benefits may not drop--[rather than] a ceiling above which they
may not rise."'" Viewed through this lens, the Court found no conflict
between California's preferential treatment of pregnancy and the PDA's
antidiscrimination principle. While the Court recognized that preferential
not identical in these cases but the nuances of the formulation are not relevant to the thesis of
this Article. For further discussion of those nuances, see Colker, supra note 37, at 1016-28.
158. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 219-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
[Blefore today, no decision of this Court has applied an elevated level of scrutiny to
invalidate a statutory discrimination harmful to males, except where the statute impaired
an important personal interest protected by the Constitution. There being no such
interest here, and there being no plausible argument that this is a discrimination against
females, the Court's reliance on our previous sex-discrimination cases is ill-founded. It
treats gender classification as a talisman which-without regard to the rights involved or
the persons affected-calls into effect a heavier burden of judicial review.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
159. See id.
160. See Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355.
161. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
162. See id. at 274-75.
163. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (emphasis added).
164. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285 (quoting California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758
F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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treatment is subject to limitations under the PDA,'65 it concluded that such
limitations were not violated in this case.
The Supreme Court decided Guerra at the beginning of its excursion
into affirmative action cases, yet only three Justices dissented from its hold-
ing. I would explain that outcome by noting that the legislation at issue did
not directly burden any identifiable group of men. The plaintiff was a
business entity that did not wish to comply with the PDA. And as the
Court noted, the state statute did not prevent an employer from providing
disability benefits to all men and women who suffer from a disabling
condition that prevents them from working.' 66 Because pregnancy is a unique
condition, the case did not pit women against an identically situated group
of men. Thus, the Court could comfortably embrace an antisubordination
perspective without concluding that the challenged action had unduly bur-
dened men. In such situations, the Court has been comfortable with an
antisubordination perspective.
The antidifferentiation and antisubordination strands of jurisprudence
continue to exist in the Court's more recent decisions. Each time a group has
asked to be categorized as a suspect class, the Court has subjected the group to
a Carolene Products historical-discrimination test.'67 And it has also contin-
ued to articulate an antidifferentiation perspective on equal treatment.'68
Tension between these two frameworks has occurred in the affirmative
action area, particularly in cases in which the Court has perceived that
whites have been disadvantaged by programs designed to assist African
165. See id. at 285 n. 17; see also id. at 294-95 (Stevens, J., concurring).
166. See id. at 291.
167. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (refus-
ing to apply heightened scrutiny to age-based classifications, noting that "even old age does not
define a 'discrete and insular' group in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process"' (quoting School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), and United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938))). More recently, in Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 631 (1996), the Supreme Court skirted the issue of whether gays and lesbians are a sus-
pect class but did recite the principle that a court will employ heightened scrutiny when evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of a law that "targets a suspect class." Even Justice Scalia's blistering
dissent suggests that the Carolene Products formulation for heightened scrutiny is still appropriate,
notwithstanding his claims that:
It is also nothing short of preposterous to call "politically unpopular" a group which
enjoys enormous influence in American media and politics, and which, as the trial court
here noted, though composing no more than 4 percent of the population had the support
of 46 percent of the voters on Amendment 2 ....
Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Although members of the Court may differ
on whether they believe a group has been subjected to historical discrimination and lacks political
power, they all seem to agree that those are important criteria for suspect class treatment.
168. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Americans. In that context, the Court has sometimes struck down affirma-
tive action programs as causing too much injury to white plaintiffs.169
The Supreme Court has justified these decisions by saying that the
affirmative action program in question could not be supported by the strict
scrutiny test that asks "whether the [program in question] is supported by a
compelling state purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish that
purpose are narrowly tailored.W71 In practical terms, the Court closely
examined the alleged harm to "innocent" parties to determine whether the
affirmative action plan was unconstitutional.
171
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education17 ' reflects a turning point in the
Court's affirmative action cases. Wygant involved the constitutionality of a
preferential protection against layoffs for some African American employ-
ees. In prior cases, the Court had found that affirmative action plans could
be constitutional even if some "sharing of the burden" on "innocent parties"
was necessary.17 1 In Wygant, however, the Court made it clear that the bur-
den on innocent parties is an important part of the assessment of whether
an affirmative action plan is sufficiently narrowly tailored to be compatible
with the Equal Protection Clause. In striking down the preferential policy,
the Court made it clear that the burden on innocent parties was a crucial
part of its calculation:
While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only
one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achiev-
ing racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious
disruption of their lives. That burden is too intrusive .... For th[is]
reason[], the Board's selection of layoffs as the means to accomplish
even a valid purpose cannot satisfy the demands of the Equal
Protection Clause.
174
169. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (federal contracts);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (city contracts); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (employment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) (higher education).
170. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
171. While I do not agree with the Court's "innocent parties" perspective, I do believe that
my description of the holdings in these cases is accurate. My purpose in this part is to offer an
accurate description, not to suggest a prescription for how the Court should consider these cases.
172. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
173. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("It is not a con-
stitutional defect in this program that it may disappoint the expectations of nonminority firms. When
effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such
'a sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is not impermissible." (quoting Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976))).
174. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84 (footnotes omitted).
The Wygant decision did not rule out the possibility of preferential
programs for African Americans, but it announced that in order to pass con-
stitutional muster those programs must not unduly burden innocent parties.
Subsequent cases in which the Supreme Court has ruled for white plaintiffs
in reverse discrimination cases have protected the interests of such innocent
parties and simultaneously continued to acknowledge the existence of an
antisubordination perspective.175 In Croson, for example, the Court suggested
that the minority contractor preference could have been justified-despite
its impact on white contractors-if the city had used a more individualized
approach to determine if contractors benefiting from the program had "suf-
fered from the effects of past discrimination by the city or prime contrac-
tors." 6 The Court also acknowledged the antisubordination justification
for strict scrutiny-even in cases brought by whites-by noting that "Clas-
sifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of
racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."'177 Presumably, the
reference to "stigmatic harm" was a reference to the harm directed towards
African Americans, not whites, from affirmative action programs. Thus,
even as the Court struck down programs designed to benefit African
Americans, it did so under the rationale that the legislature was, in fact,
misguided in thinking that it was benefiting African Americans. The
Court insisted that it was benefiting African Americans in striking down
programs enacted to benefit African Americans.
Thus, one can conclude from the law of race discrimination that the
Court has grown increasingly hostile towards affirmative action programs
that result in direct and distinct burdens on whites. But the Court has
not gone so far as to base the law of equal protection solely on an anti-
differentiation perspective. It has also not gone so far as to say that no
burdens on whites are permissible under affirmative action programs.
175. Only Justices Thomas and Scalia have rejected the antisubordination principle
entirely. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas states:
I [disagree] with the premise underlying [the dissents]: that there is a racial paternalism
exception to the principle of equal protection. I believe that there is a "moral [and] con-
stitutional equivalence," post, at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting), between laws designed to
subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster
some current notion of equality. Government cannot make us equal; it can only recog-
nize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law.
Id.
176. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,508 (1989).
177. Id. at 493.
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2. Disability-Based Discrimination
The constitutional law of disability discrimination is not as rich as the
law of race discrimination, but, as we will see below, it also reflects a recog-
nition of both the antisubordination and the antidifferentiation frame-
works. Thus, it is simply wrong as a factual matter to read the Supreme
Court's decisions under the Equal Protection Clause to require a pure anti-
differentiation approach.
The leading disability case under section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment is City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 7 -a case that
directly raised the question of the constitutionality of a state entity's using
a disability-based classification in a way that harmed the interests of indi-
viduals with mental retardation. The zoning regulations at issue permitted
hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes, or homes for convalescents or the aged
to be operated in an area zoned as R-3 (an apartment house zoning stan-
dard 79) but required homes "for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics
or drug addicts" to receive a special use permit, which had to be renewed
annually."s Not only did the city zoning regulations require a special use
permit based on one's status as "insane or feeble-minded," but the city council
voted three to one to deny a special use permit when a group home for indi-
viduals who are mentally retarded requested such a permit. Thus, the city
had a per se discriminatory classification system, and the city council did
not take steps to undo the discriminatory impact of its classification system.
The Supreme Court decided City of Cleburne in 1985, at a time when
it had recently created a three-tiered classification scheme for race-, gender-,
and age-based classifications.'' A majority of the Court declined to adopt
heightened scrutiny for individuals with mental retardation, but the Court's
reasoning was very fractured, with two separate concurring opinions.
Against this backdrop of three levels of scrutiny, the majority chose to
employ the lowest level of review-rational basis scrutiny-for individuals
who are mentally retarded. The reason for this choice was that the majority
178. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
179. See id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring).
180. See id. at 436 n.3.
181. As the majority opinion acknowledged in City of Cleburne, racial categories were "sub-
jected to strict scrutiny and [would] be sustained only if they [were] suitably tailored to serve a
compelling state interest." Id. at 440. Gender classifications, the majority acknowledged, were
subjected to a "heightened standard of review" under which "[a] gender classification fails unless it
is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest." Id. at 440-41. Age
classifications, by contrast, the majority recognized, were not subjected to heightened review because
"individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests
the State has the authority to implement." Id. at 441.
considered it more likely that governmental entities would seek to pass leg-
islation to enhance the position of individuals with mental retardation than
that it would pass legislation to harm their position. It noted that Congress
had recently passed the Rehabilitation Act, the Developmental Disabilities
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, and the Education of the Handicapped
Act, and states had passed legislation that "acknowledges the special status
of the mentally retarded by conferring certain rights upon them . ,,,." If
the Court adopted heightened scrutiny, these special programs-because
they created disability-specific classifications-would be subjected to the
presumption that they were unconstitutional. The majority did not con-
sider it appropriate for the judiciary to operate under such a presumption:
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the government
may legitimately take into account in a wide range of decisions, and
because both State and Federal Governments have recently commit-
ted themselves to assisting the retarded, we will not presume that any
given legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded indi-
viduals, is rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not
tolerate. 
83
The majority therefore adopted rational basis scrutiny in order to give
the states and the federal government the flexibility to pass legislation to
assist individuals with mental retardation without having to meet the cum-
bersome standard of heightened scrutiny:
To withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes
between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally related
to a legitimate governmental purpose. This standard, we believe,
affords government the latitude necessary both to pursue policies
designed to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to
freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the retarded in
what is essentially an incidental manner.'
84
The majority was clearly aware of the way existing legislation at the
federal level both assisted and, in some cases, disadvantaged individuals with
mental retardation. And, as the majority specifically noted, this body of law
included a federal regulation that exempted individuals with mental retar-
dation from the requirements of a competitive examination when seeking
governmental employment.'85 The majority opinion sanctioned these meas-
ures as consistent with its understanding of the Equal Protection Clause. The
majority understood that heightened scrutiny would create a reverse discrimi-
182. Id. at 444.
183. Id. at 446.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 443-44.
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nation problem, because special treatment would have to be justified under
a heightened level of scrutiny.
Thus, it was one of the Court's leading antidifferentiation advocates-
Justice White (joined by Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, Powell, and
O'Connor)-who authored the majority opinion in City of Cleburne, paving
the way for special treatment under the rubric of rational basis review while
leaving intact the Court's recent case law deriding special treatment under
the rubric of heightened scrutiny in the race and gender area. The opinion
clearly envisioned special treatment for individuals with disabilities under
rational basis review.
The leading antisubordination advocates on the Court-Justices
Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun-concurred separately, arguing for height-
ened scrutiny. Like the members of the majority, these Justices would also
favor the constitutionality of special treatment for individuals with disabili-
ties. But because they would not perceive the invocation of heightened
scrutiny as constituting the death knell for special treatment, they could
call for heightened scrutiny without being concerned about some problem-
atic collateral consequences. In fact, they could have perceived the crea-
tion of heightened scrutiny for a group that would most likely receive
statutory preferential treatment as an aid in the development of the anti-
subordination perspective, because it would have forced the Court to
develop a coherent framework for approving preferential treatment." In any
event, it is clear that there were at least eight votes consistent with special
treatment for individuals with disabilities in the City of Cleburne decision."7
186. By contrast, most of the race and gender cases dealing with preferential treatment have
struck down such measures, leaving little insight into what kinds of preferential measures might be
sustainable.
187. The final opinion in the case-authored by Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger-
straddled the line between the antisubordination and the antidifferentiation perspectives. The
Justices argued that there should be a single, rather than tiered, standard of equal protection review.
See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring). This moderate view recognized the
antisubordination observation that the "Court must be especially vigilant in evaluating the ration-
ality of any classification involving a group that has been subjected to a 'tradition of disfavor .. "'
Id. at 453 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring). But it also "will result in the virtually automatic invalidation
of racial classifications," id. at 453 (Stevens, J., concurring), which reflects an antidifferentiation
approach. Unlike the opinion by Justice White, this opinion did not offer any examples in which
a governmental entity created a preferential program for individuals with disabilities, so it does
not precisely explain how such measures would be evaluated under the single-tier framework.
Given the antisubordination strand in their opinion, however, it does appear likely that both
Justices would have endorsed special treatment for individuals with disabilities. Because that
question was not directly before the Court in City of Cleburne, they may not have perceived any
reason to comment on that possibility. Justice Stevens formally joined the majority opinion by
Justice White, including its statements about special treatment. Justice Burger did not join the
majority opinion, so his position on the constitutionality of special treatment for individuals with
mental retardation is unknown.
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It turns City of Cleburne on its head to say that the majority chose
rational basis scrutiny because it wanted to restrict the power of Congress to
impose affirmative obligations on the states to benefit individuals with dis-
abilities. ' In fact, the majority's belief that Congress would be imposing
those obligations on the states led it to choose rational basis scrutiny.
When the Court decided City of Cleburne, it was specifically aware of the
history of discrimination against individuals with disabilities in our country,
because the City of Cleburne fact pattern was one of those examples. More
generally, the eloquent concurrence by Justice Marshall detailed that his-
tory. The majority did not choose rational basis scrutiny because it failed to
believe that such discrimination occurred. It chose rational basis scrutiny
because it had confidence that federal and state governments were seeking
to create affirmative rights for individuals with disabilities. "That a civi-
lized and decent society expects and approves such legislation indicates that
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast majority of
situations is not only legitimate but also desirable."'89 The majority then
hinted that such legislation might be harder to justify under heightened
scrutiny, but that such problems would lessen under rational basis scru-
tiny.190 Most importantly, not one member of the Supreme Court in City of
Cleburne hinted that the various opinions were intended to strike a death
knell for federal legislation designed to assist individuals with disabilities.
Only a majority of the Court insisted on rational basis scrutiny, but eight
members of the Court explicitly agreed on the need to have affirmative
legislative protections for individuals with disabilities.
It is also important to recognize that the Court did not choose rational
basis scrutiny because it doubted whether individuals with disabilities were
a discrete and insular class. 9' Rather, it merely did not think the group
188. Nonetheless, that position has been taken by some lower court judges. See, e.g., Pierce
v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 940 (E.D.N.C. 1996), aff'd, 131 F.3d 136 (4th Cit. 1997), vacated on
other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 33 (1998) (mem.) (concluding that section five only permits Congress to
enact legislation in a "neutral manner," rather than in a "positive" manner).
189. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
190. The Court stated:
It may be, as [the plaintiff] contends, that legislation designed to benefit, rather than dis-
advantage, the retarded would generally withstand examination under a test of heightened
scrutiny. The relevant inquiry, however, is whether heightened scrutiny is constitution-
ally mandated in the first instance.... Especially given the wide variation in the abilities
and needs of the retarded themselves, governmental bodies must have a certain amount
of flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and limiting their remedial
efforts.
Id. at 444-45 (citation omitted).
191. The majority described individuals with mental retardation as "different, immutably
so." Id. at 442.
would benefit from the inflexibility of the strict scrutiny test, which would
unduly hamper states in their ability to enact special protection legislation.
Of special importance for this Article's section five analysis, the Court rec-
ognized the importance of federal legislation that prohibited discrimination
on the basis of disability, such as the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.'92 It is fair to speculate that
the Cleburne Court would have been shocked to learn that its opinion could
be used to strike down federal legislation, such as ADA Title II, that seeks
to extend the nondiscrimination protections created under section 504.
Hence, the City of Cleburne decision clearly supports the compatibility of the
antidifferentiation and antisubordination perspectives underlying the law of
disability discrimination. While the Court felt comfortable striking down a
zoning ordinance that was rooted in animus against individuals with mental
retardation, it deliberately chose a framework that would not put an end to
special protection.
In sum, the antidifferentiation and antisubordination frameworks have
been able to cohabit in harmony under the law of disability discrimination.
Merely because a program offers a special benefit to individuals with dis-
abilities does not mean that it takes away opportunities from nondisabled
individuals. The affirmative action cases have sometimes raised such con-
flicts, and, in such contexts, the Court has sometimes chosen the antidiffer-
entiation perspective over the antisubordination perspective. But it is wrong
to generalize from the affirmative action cases that the antisubordination
framework has no place under section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Instead, we should step back from those cases and see that the Court
generally recognizes both an antidifferentiation and an antisubordination
framework; the antisubordination framework gives way to the antidiffer-
entiation framework only in certain situations in which the rights of some
individuals are unduly burdened by the special protection rights accorded to
other individuals.
193
192. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
193. I have deliberately used the phrase "unduly burdens," because the Court has consis-
tently permitted some burdens to be imposed on some individuals to remedy discrimination
against other individuals. The Court is engaged in a balancing test-when certain individuals
have provided convincing evidence of past discrimination, the Court is willing to permit some
burdens on other individuals. As the evidence of past discrimination becomes more amorphous,
the Court is less tolerant of burdens on others. This Article does not precisely describe the degree
of burden permitted by the Court to justify special protection legislation, because the ADA does
not impose direct burdens on any identifiable concrete group.
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III. ADA TITLE II
A. Introduction
In the last several years, the Eighth Circuit9 and six district courts' 9'
have concluded that Congress exceeded its enforcement authority under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted ADA Title 1I
and provided for a private right of action for monetary relief. Dissenting
judges in the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh circuits have adopted this view.1 96
By contrast, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have unanimously concluded
that ADA Title II constitutionally abrogates state sovereign immunity. 97
The other circuits have not yet decided this issue.
The analysis offered by these courts of ADA Title 1I's constitutionality
has not followed the principles discussed in this Article. Courts have failed
194. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 2000
WL 63302 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2000) (No. 99-423); see also Humenansky v. Regents of the Univ. of
Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 826-28 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the ADEA was an invalid exercise of
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment, section five enforcement powers).
195. See Hedgepeth v. Tennessee, 33 F. Supp. 2d 668, 677 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) ("Congress
did not have the authority to enact the accommodation provisions of the ADA, and Congress did
not effectively abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity with respect to those
provisions."); Kilcullen v. New York State Dep't of Transp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 133, 152 (N.D.N.Y.
1999) ("[T]he accommodation requirement, and thus the employment anti-discrimination
provision which contains it, is an invalid exercise of Congress's enforcement power under section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Garrett v. Board of Trustees, 989 F. Supp. 1409, 1410 (N.D.
Ala. 1998) ("Congress cannot stretch Section 5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to force a state to provide allegedly equal treatment by guaranteeing special
treatment or 'accommodation' for disabled persons .... ); Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor
Vehicles, 987 F. Supp. 451, 459 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that Congress does not have the power
under the Fourteenth Amendment "to single out disabled individuals for advantageous
treatment"); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(holding that Congress does not have the power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of states from
suit by private persons under the ADA through the provision of the reasonable-accommodation
requirement); Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932, 940 (E.D.N.C. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 136 (4th Cir.
1997), vacated on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 33 (1998) (mem.) ("Unlike traditional anti-discrimination
laws, the ADA demands entitlement in order to achieve its goals. This the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot authorize."). But see Johnson v. State Tech. Ctr., 24 F. Supp. 2d 833, 844 (W.D. Tenn.
1998) ("mhis court agrees with the majority of the courts that have faced this issue and concludes
that the ADA... did validly abrogate the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity."); Lamb v.
John Umstead Hosp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 498, 510 (E.D.N.C. 1998) ("mhe enactment of the ADA falls
within Congress's Section 5 enforcement power and consequently constitutes a valid and effective
abrogation of the States' immunity to suit.").
196. See Amos v. Maryland Dept. of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 178 F.3d 212, 225
(4th Cir. 1999) (Williams, J., dissenting); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1444
(11th Cir. 1998) (Cox, J., dissenting), aff d, Nos. 98-791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165 (U.S. Jan. 11,
2000); Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1998) (Smith, J., dissenting).
197. See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cit. 1997); Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of
Corrections, 115 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997).
to understand that Congress may enact legislation that goes beyond the
Supreme Court's prior decisions regarding unconstitutionality under section
one so long as the four principles are met. They have confused the stan-
dards under section one of the Fourteenth Amendment for determining
whether states have violated section one with the standards under section
five for determining whether Congress is empowered to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment. 9s
Nonetheless, I would not suggest that the question of whether ADA
Title I meets the requirements of section five is an easy one. I shall now
apply the four principles to ADA Title I1 to determine if its enforcement
scheme passes constitutional muster, recognizing that principle four poses the
most significant hurdle.
B. Explicit Abrogation
ADA Title II readily meets the explicit abrogation requirement, if that
requirement is applicable to ADA Title I1. Under the explicit abrogation
requirement, Congress must provide a plain statement of abrogation of state
sovereign immunity if the legislation intrudes into an essential state func-
tion. Although it is possible that ADA Title IL intrudes into essential state
functions in some minor areas, it is unlikely that the title as a whole does
so. States provide transportation, education, housing, and many other
services that are also provided by the private sector and are not central to a
state's functioning. Nonetheless, on the assumption that a court would
198. Judge Boyle took that position in Brown v. North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles in
which he concluded that Congress may not ground its action on the Fourteenth Amendment if the
class of individuals being protected is not entitled to heightened scrutiny. See Brown, 987 F. Supp.
at 457; Jesse H. Choper, On the Difference in Importance Between Supreme Court Doctrine and Actual
Consequences: A Review of the Supreme Court's 1996-1997 Term, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 2259, 2298-
2302 (1998) (suggesting that Congress has the authority to provide protections for nonsuspect
classes against state action but only if the Court can be persuaded that much of the conduct outlawed
by the federal statute has a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional); S. Elizabeth Wilborn
Malloy, Whose Federalism?, 32 IND. L. REV. 45, 65 (1998) (suggesting that Congress has the authority
to provide protections for nonsuspect classes against state action so long as "Congress ... find[s] facts
that demonstrate the existence of invidious discrimination in a law which would otherwise withstand
rational basis scrutiny"); Thro, supra note 55, at 520 (suggesting that Congress has the power to pro-
tect nonsuspect classes from equal protection violations so long as those prohibitions are "coextensive
with the Fourteenth Amendment"); see also Note, Section 5 and the Protection of Nonsuspect Classes
After City of Boeme v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1542, 1552 (1998) (arguing that Congress has
the authority to protect nonsuspect classes against state action but only if Congress creates a strong
record that a group is subject to arbitrary or invidious discrimination). See generally Elizabeth Welter,
Note, The ADA's Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment State Immunity as a Valid Exercise of Congress's
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1139 (1998).
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conclude that some or all of these activities meet the essential state function
test, it is clear that ADA Title II meets the explicit abrogation requirement.
ADA Title II directly regulates the states. It provides that "no quali-
fied individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity."'" The term "public entity" is defined as including "any State or
local government."2" The statute also expressly abrogates state immunity.201
All the lower courts have agreed that the ADA does contain a clear
statement of abrogation; indeed, its abrogation could hardly be clearer. 2
Thus, it plainly meets the first principle for valid section five legislation-it
explicitly abrogates state sovereign immunity.
C. Fact Finding
The factual basis for ADA Title I is also quite clear. The consti-
tutional challenges to ADA Title I have not questioned whether Congress
engaged in sufficient fact finding before enacting the ADA. The legislation
was subject to numerous hearings over a period of several years, document-
ing the need for legislation in this area."3 Thus, it clearly meets the second
principle for valid section five legislation--Congress acted on the basis of
an adequate legislative record.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
200. Id. § 12131(1)(A).
201. See id. § 12202 ("A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdic-
tion for a violation of this chapter.").
202. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11 th Cir. 1998) ("In
sharp contrast to the ADEA, the ADA does include a clear statement of intent to abrogate ... "
affd, Nos. 98-791, 98-796, 2000 WL 14165 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2000).
203. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 37 (1990).
[Wihere there is no state law prohibiting discriminatory practices, two programs that are
exactly alike, except for funding sources, can treat people with disabilities completely
differently than others who don't have disabilities. The resulting inconsistent treatment
of people with disabilities by different State or local government agencies is both inequi-
table and illogical for a society committed to full access for people with disabilities.
Id. at 37; see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select
Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 26 (1988) (statement of Charles Crawford,
Commissioner, Massachusetts Commission for the Blind) (comparing the daily impact of dis-
crimination against people with disabilities with discrimination against women, minorities, and the
poor); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary and the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 2273, 101st Cong.
416 (1990) (testimony of James W. Ellis, President, American Association on Mental Retardation)
(arguing that state laws have not protected people with disabilities against discrimination).
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D. Enforcement of a Nonfundamental Right
The third principle should also not be a significant hurdle to the consti-
tutionality of ADA Title II, because Congress has the authority to regulate
the states under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment even with
regard to groups entitled to nonsuspect class treatment under section one.
The right to equal protection under section one is granted to all individuals
in our society-not only to individuals who belong to suspect classes. The
Supreme Court has consistently recognized this principle through the crea-
tion of the rational basis scrutiny framework that it applies to claims of dis-
crimination brought by nonsuspect classes under section one.2"' If nonsuspect
classes have the right to bring claims of discrimination under section one,
then, as a logical matter, Congress has the power to enforce those equal
protection rights under section five.
The Fourteenth Amendment offers the equal protection standard to
all "persons.""2 5 The level of scrutiny is influenced by the type of alleged
discrimination, but it is simply not true that the Fourteenth Amendment
fails to apply for those individuals in classes not subjected to heightened
scrutiny. Hence, in City of Cleburne, the Supreme Court struck down the
city zoning regulation under the rubric of rationale basis scrutiny. If ADA
Title II were inconsistent with the third principle, then the Supreme Court
should have dismissed City of Cleburne as improperly brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment, because a nonsuspect class would have no equal
protection rights whatsoever.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the Supreme Court did not intend its
invocation of rational basis scrutiny in City of Cleburne to limit Congress's
power to pass legislation on behalf of individuals with disabilities. In fact, it
chose rational basis scrutiny to increase the flexibility of both federal and
state legislatures to enhance the legal rights of individuals with disabilities.
The fact that Congress has power to protect the rights of individuals
with disabilities should be relatively noncontroversial in light of the City of
Cleburne decision. Congress is not constrained by the limits of prior consti-
tutional findings of violations by the Supreme Court when it has created
an ample legislative record to demonstrate that enforcement legislation is nec-
essary in the equal protection context. Thus, the only principle that should be
deserving of extended discussion should be the fourth principle--whether
204. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1976)
(applying the rational basis scrutiny framework to a claim of age-based discrimination).
205. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Congress violated a nonprotected group's constitutional rights when accord-
ing special protection to another group.
E. Violation of a Constitutional Right
The fourth principle represents the most significant hurdle for ADA
Title II, because the title arguably provides special protection rights for indi-
viduals with disabilities. Do those rights conflict with the rights of others?
States have argued that even if Congress has enforcement authority for
a group that is not a suspect class, that enforcement authority cannot accord
"special treatment" through, for example, a reasonable accommodation
requirement."' This argument is in need of serious attention. Other com-
mentators have ignored this issue and, instead, blended principles three and
four into a single issue-assuming that if Congress has section five enforce-
ment authority for nonsuspect classes that its enforcement authority is unlim-
ited.2"7 Lower courts have completely misunderstood this issue, assuming
that they should apply the rational basis scrutiny framework to section five
cases involving nonsuspect classes, without recognizing that that framework
is only applicable to cases brought by individuals who claim to have been a
victim of a state's equal protection violation under section one.
In order to apply principle number four, one must have a good sense of
the scope of special protection provided by ADA Title II. Generally, the
nondiscrimination principle found in ADA Title II forbids direct violations
of the equal treatment principle as well as indirect violations through neu-
tral policies that serve to exclude individuals with disabilities from benefits
or programs.0  In addition, ADA Title II envisions special treatment
to enable individuals with disabilities to be able to participate fully in pro-
grams or activities by requiring "reasonable modifications to rules, policies,
206. In Pierce v. King, 918 F. Supp. 932 (E.D.N.C. 1996), affd, 131 F.3d 136 (4th Cit.
1997), vacated on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 33 (1998) (mem.), Judge Boyle found that ADA Title
II was unconstitutional, stating that the Fourteenth Amendment can only justify a right to be
"treated in a neutral manner" but not a "positive rightj to entitlement against other individuals
and state governments." Id. at 940. That decision was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of
its decision in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). Similarly,
Judge Graham concluded in Nihiser v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168
(S.D. Ohio 1997), that ADA Title II was unconstitutional because it "'shifts away from similar
treatment to different treatment of the disabled by accommodating their disabilities."' Id. at 1173-74
(quoting Riel v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also Hedgepeth v.
Tennessee, 33 F. Supp. 2d 668 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Garrett v. Board of Trustees, 989 F. Supp. 1409
(N.D. Ala. 1998) (invalidating the special treatment of individuals with disabilities).
207. See, e.g., Welter, supra note 198, at 1162 (arguing that the constitutional law of dis-
ability discrimination "presents no barrier to Congress's ability to prohibit irrational discrimina-
tion based on disability").
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994).
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or practices, the removal of architectural ... barriers, or the provision of
auxiliary aids and services."2" In the employment context, ADA Title II uses
the standards set forth in ADA Title I (the employment title)." '° Those stan-
dards, in turn, require that employers make "reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability." '
The requirements to create "reasonable modifications" or "reasonable
accommodations," however, are not unlimited. Title I explicitly recognizes
an "undue hardship" defense.2 ' Courts have consistently interpreted that
defense to mean that individuals with disabilities never have the statutory
right to "bump" a nondisabled employee from his or her employment posi-
tion.2 13 In the regulations promulgated under ADA Title I, the Depart-
ment of Justice's regulations recognize that a reasonable modification is not
necessary when "making the modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the service, program, or activity.)
214
The Supreme Court has also recognized the limits contained in ADA
Title I for the reasonable modification requirement in a case challenging
the failure of the state to offer individuals with mental disabilities the
209. Id. § 12131(2) (defining "qualified individual with a disability"). In this Article, I am not
directly challenging the assertion that these rules can be characterized as "special protection" rules,
because the lower courts have uniformly characterized them in that way. One could, however, argue
that reasonable accommodation rules are merely an extension of the principle of antidiscrimination.
An example can demonstrate how hard it is to classify such rules. Suppose a bakery had an entrance
with a three-inch step that could not be crossed by an individual who uses a wheelchair. It would be
a reasonable modification to have the step removed and replaced with a ramp. Whether you view
that modification as special treatment or equal treatment may depend on how you view the problem.
Is the problem that the builder and architect designed the building with nonwheelchair users in
mind? Had they envisioned a world of more diversity, which included individuals who use
wheelchairs, would those steps have been built in the first place? Or is the problem with the
owner of the bakery who is renting that space? Should the owner of the bakery be asked to retrofit
the building's design to accommodate wheelchair users? The retrofitting solution might better fit the
special treatment than the equal treatment model because no action is necessary to permit nonwheel-
chair users to enter the store (other than opening the door) when the steps are in place. A ramp
would largely serve the needs of wheelchair users (as well as parents pushing strollers). Damages
against the builder and architect might better fit the antidifferentiation model, because the
principle of nondiscrimination should have influenced the original choice of design.
210. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b)(1) (1998) ("For purposes of this part, the requirements of title I of
the Act, as established by the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission... apply
to employment in any service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity ... .
211. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
212. See id. § 12111(10).
213. See, e.g., Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1997); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995);
Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1995); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118
(10th Cir. 1995).
214. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).
opportunity to live in an integrated environment. The Court has inter-
preted the reasonable modification requirement to give the state the flexi-
bility to protect the interests of individuals outside the plaintiffs class while
also seeking to offer integrated opportunities to plaintiffs. It said:
Sensibly construed, the fundamental-alteration component of the
reasonable-modifications regulation would allow the State to show
that, in the allocation of available resources, immediate relief for the
plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has
undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse popula-
tion of persons with mental disabilities."5
The Court was concerned that a more limited fundamental-alteration
defense could harm the interests of persons other than the plaintiffs who
had mental disabilities, because it might force the state to "phase out insti-
tutions, placing patients in need of close care at risk. 216
Thus, ADA Title II does provide special protection to individuals with
disabilities in certain circumstances. Yet Congress was careful to create rea-
sonable defenses for the states, and the courts have been careful to construe
those defenses relatively broadly. Thus, ADA Title II does not, in any way,
violate the constitutional rights of nondisabled individuals. In those rare
cases in which special treatment would cause undue hardship to others, Con-
gress was careful to provide for an appropriate defense. ADA Title II carefully
balanced the rights of all members of our society to equal treatment while
also, in some cases, providing for special protection for individuals with
disabilities.
It might be the case that if the courts' interpretations of the ADA rec-
ognized fewer defenses, the ADA could run afoul of section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment. But the courts have repeatedly said that we should
not declare a statute unconstitutional out of fear of consequences that have
not yet occurred. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Olmstead has
ensured that ADA Title II will be interpreted to give a state the flexibility
to consider the needs of all its citizens as it meets the special protection
needs of some individuals with disabilities. It therefore appears that ADA
Title II is a well-crafted statute that properly recognizes both the antidiffer-
entiation and the antisubordination principles underlying the law of equal
protection in the disability context. If the lower courts would begin to
engage in a closer examination of both the structure of the ADA and the
Supreme Court's prior case law under the Equal Protection Clause, they
215. Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2178 (1999).
216. Id. at 2179.
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would learn that ADA Title II is appropriate enforcement legislation pursu-
ant to Congress's powers under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
State sovereignty is the current battleground for narrowing Congress's
authority to pass legislation. Although some authorities have predicted the
death knell of damages actions against state actors under the civil rights
statutes in light of the Supreme Court's evolving case law in this area, I
believe it is too early to predict such a dire result. The Court has not back-
peddled on the fact that section five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 17 Moreover, it is
unthinkable that the Court will ever strike down damages actions under
CRA Title VII, given the Court's consistent statements that abrogation of
state sovereign immunity was appropriate under that statute. Thus, the
important challenge is to determine how the Court will develop a frame-
work that preserves its CRA Title VII case law while also preserving its
recent decisions striking down various federal statutes as abrogating state
sovereign immunity.
I have argued that four principles emerge from the Court's rulings that
can help reconcile these seemingly conflicting decisions. First, Congress
must explicitly abrogate state sovereign immunity if the legislation infringes
on a traditional and essential state function. Second, Congress must create
an ample record to justify the need for such legislation. Third, Congress
must be seeking to protect interests in an area in which the Court has pre-
viously found that some genuine rights exist. Fourth, Congress's enforce-
ment efforts under section five must not, themselves, violate another section
of the Constitution.
My framework makes two important and original contributions to our
understanding of section five. First, it recognizes that the third principle
should not play a major role in cases involving Congress's power to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause. Because the Equal Protection Clause provides
rights to all persons, any nondiscrimination legislation can be understood as
being properly grounded in the law of equal protection. By contrast, legisla-
tion seeking to enforce the Due Process Clause may not be properly
217. It is also important to remember that even if Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its powers under section five, it still can use the Commerce Clause to create
injunctive relief against state actors. Thus, claimants like the plaintiffs in Olmstead should be able
to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief irrespective of how the Eleventh Amendment evolves
unless the Court chooses to reconsider Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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grounded in a genuine constitutional right, because the Court has fashioned
a more narrow enforcement standard under the Due Process Clause than
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Second, my framework recognizes the importance of the fourth princi-
ple in equal protection cases. The fourth principle does not limit Congress
to the legal standards previously determined by the Court under section one
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on the historical record, I have
argued that the ratifiers and framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to give enforcement powers to Congress that are independent of the
Court's prior decisions under section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nonetheless, Congress does not have the power to go so far as to violate the
equality interests of nonprotected class members.
The question of whether Congress has violated the rights of nonpro-
tected class members under the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guar-
antee when it has sought to create equality rights for protected class
members under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment can be a diffi-
cult one. I have argued that this line is crossed only when legislation
unduly burdens the rights of nonprotected class members.
ADA Title II clearly meets the requirements of section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment under this proposed framework. It explicitly abro-
gates state sovereign immunity, was based on appropriate Congressional fact
finding, protects genuine constitutional rights, and does not violate the Fifth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee. The courts should not reflexively
strike down ADA Title II's enforcement scheme under the fourth principle
merely because it accords special protection to some groups in our society.
Because this legislation does not unduly burden the rights of nonprotected
class members, it clearly is in accordance with the Fifth Amendment's equal
protection guarantee.
The framework that I have proposed could be used to consider the con-
stitutionality of the abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the FMLA,
the EPA, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and other civil rights statutes. In the
coming years, we can anticipate that each of these civil rights statutes will
come under close constitutional scrutiny. In considering these cases, the
Court should develop a framework that is consistent with the aspirations of
the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is a way to get
out of the section five quagmire while retaining genuine protection against
discrimination by state actors.
